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INTRODUCTION 
A woman who is addicted to heroin discovers that she is pregnant. She 
quickly realizes her limited options: continue to use heroin, quit “cold turkey,”1 or 
seek medical rehabilitation. She learns that if she chooses to quit cold turkey, she is 
likely to miscarry. On the other hand, should she continue to use heroin, the state 
will take away her child, once born. In review of these possibilities, she believes 
seeking medical rehabilitation, such as a methadone-treatment program, will be the 
most responsible decision. However, she soon learns that because her child could 
suffer withdrawal symptoms at birth, state child services will strip her of custody 
and accuse her with civil child abuse and neglect before she even leaves the delivery 
room. 
Many pregnant women across the country who are addicted to heroin and 
other opiates face this reality.2 In N.J. Division of Youth & Family Services v. Y.N., the 
New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division addressed this catch-22 situation.3 
The court held that under a New Jersey civil statute dealing with child abuse,4 a 
pregnant woman obtaining doctor-recommended methadone treatment that 
                                                          
1  “Cold turkey” is the “abrupt withdrawal of narcotics from an addict without the use of 
medications to reduce the discomfort and minimize the symptoms resulting therefrom.” Andrew G. 
Bucaro & Mary Williams Cazalas, Methadone: Treatment and Control of Narcotic Addiction, 44 TUL. 
L. REV. 14, 19 (1969). 
2  Heroin is just one type of opiate, but for the purposes of this Note, I will be using “heroin” 
and “opiate” interchangeably. 
3  66 A.3d 237 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2013). 
4  N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:6–8.21(c)(4)(b) (West 2012). 
Indiana Journal of Law and Social Equality Vol. 4, Issue 1 
 
*    100 
harmed the fetus had committed child abuse.5 After the New Jersey Division of 
Youth and Family Services took the woman’s newborn son into custody, she filed 
suit to regain custody of her child.6 
 Child protective services’ removal of an infant because of the mother’s 
participation in methadone maintenance treatment (MMT) during pregnancy 
alarmingly violates those women’s rights.7 These rights include, but are not limited 
to, those provided in Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), which 
precludes public entities from discriminating against individuals on the basis of a 
disability.8 In cases such as Y.N., a state agency’s removal of a child because of his or 
her mother’s participation in a drug rehabilitation program counteracts the exact 
purpose of Title II of the ADA: to protect individuals with disabilities from 
discrimination.9 
This Note will explain how Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 
1990 is violated when a state department takes custody of an infant solely because 
his or her mother participated in a methadone maintenance program during 
pregnancy. Part I of this Note examines the case of Y.N.—a case that demonstrates 
why the ADA is necessary to protect both women and their children. Part II of this 
Note provides a background on methadone maintenance treatment, with a focus on 
how it is the recommended and preferred treatment for pregnant women with 
opiate addictions. Part II also briefly discusses how the New Jersey state legislature’s 
policies, as interpreted by the appellate court, are misguided and run counter to 
state interests in maternal and fetal health. Part III reviews the flawed legal analysis 
used by the appellate court in the case of N.J. Division of Youth & Family Services v. 
Y.N.,10 and how the standard set by the appellate court in this case leads to an 
overbroad application of the New Jersey child abuse and neglect statute by depriving 
pregnant women of choices regarding daily activities. Part IV describes the 
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 and explores interpretations of Title II. This 
                                                          
5             See Y.N., 66 A.3d at 242 (“The fact that defendant obtained the methadone from a legal source 
does not preclude our consideration of the harm it caused to the newborn. An inquiry under N.J.S.A. 
9:6–8.21 must focus on the harm to the child, rather than on the intent of the caregiver. G.S. v. Dep’t 
of Human Servs., 157 N.J. 161, 180–81, 723 A.2d 612 (1999). Harm to the child need not be intentional 
in order to substantiate a finding of abuse or neglect. N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. M.C. III, 
990 A.2d 1097, 1106 (2010).”). 
6  See Y.N., 66 A.3d at 239. 
7  Pregnancy and state intervention has created numerous constitutional arguments amongst 
legal scholars. For discussions that a woman’s constitutional liberties and autonomy are violated 
when medical choices are restricted by the state, see, for example, Julie B. Ehrlich, Breaking the Law 
by Giving Birth: The War on Drugs, the War on Reproductive Rights, and the War on Women, 32 N.Y.U. 
REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 381 (2008); see also Molly McNulty, Pregnancy Police: The Health Policy & 
Legal Implications of Punishing Pregnant Women for Harm to Their Fetuses, 16 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. 
CHANGE 277 (1989). 
8  A Guide to Disability Rights Laws, U.S. DEP’T JUST. C.R. DIV. (July 2009), 
http://www.ada.gov/cguide.htm. 
9  See Y.N., 66 A.3d 237; see also 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b) (2012). 
10  66 A.3d 237 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2013). 
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exploration reveals the purpose of Title II of the ADA and provides guidance for how 
courts should interpret it in the future. Finally, Part V ties the analysis together to 
explain how Title II of the ADA protects the parental rights of pregnant women 
participating in MMT. 
 
I. THE HARM OF OVERBROAD STATUTORY INTERPRETATION IN THE 
CASE OF Y.N. 
Y.N. had been using prescription Percocet11 prior to her pregnancy.12 Upon 
learning of her pregnancy, she continued to use Percocet for four months before 
entering a methadone treatment program.13 Y.N. began taking methadone 
prescribed by her doctor on January 5, 201114 and continued the methadone 
treatment through February 18, 2011,15 when she gave birth to her son, Paul.16 Upon 
birth, Paul tested positive for methadone and was diagnosed with neonatal 
abstinence syndrome (NAS).17 Due to Paul’s withdrawal symptoms, he was placed in 
the neonatal intensive care unit and given morphine doses to manage the effects of 
his withdrawal.18  
The New Jersey Division of Youth and Family Services (“Division”) quickly 
began an investigation of Y.N.19 When Paul was due to be released from the hospital, 
on April 1, 2011, the Division placed a hold preventing his discharge.20 “The Division 
then filed a complaint and order to show cause seeking custody, care, and 
supervision of Paul.”21 Upon review of the case, the judge decided the Division had 
not established that Y.N. presented a risk of harm to her child, and the child was 
released to Y.N.’s custody, pending Y.N.’s negative drug screening.22 Because Y.N. 
failed this screening, the Division retained supervision and care of the child.23  
A fact-finding hearing was held on June 29, 2011.24 At this hearing, Y.N. 
testified and the infant’s medical records were examined.25 Y.N. testified that she 
was taking prescribed Percocet when she became pregnant and was told that if she 
                                                          
11  Percocet contains oxycodone; oxycodone is an opioid pain medication. Percocet, 
DRUGS.COM, http://www.drugs.com/percocet.html (last visited Jan. 6, 2015). 
12  Oral Argument at 02:10, N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. Y.N., 104 A.3d 244 (N. J. 2014) 
(No. 072804), http://165.230.71.5/query.php?var=A-24-13.  
13  Y.N., 66 A.3d at 241. 
14  Id. at 239. 
15  See id. 
16  Id.  
17  Id. at 239–40. 
18  Id. at 240; see also id. at 242( “Paul’s discharge summary indicates that it took thirty-nine 
days until the morphine could be discontinued.”). 
19  Id. at 240. 
20  Id. 
21  Id. 
22  Id. 
23  Id. 
24  Id. 
25  Id. 
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stopped taking Percocet, she could lose the baby due to withdrawal.26 The trial court 
found by a preponderance of the evidence that Y.N. abused or neglected Paul.27 
When the case reached the appellate court, the court relied on the “harm” 
element of New Jersey’s civil child abuse and neglect statute.28 The statute provides 
a definition for an “abused or neglected child”: 
 
[A] child whose physical, mental, or emotional condition has been impaired or is in 
imminent danger of becoming impaired as the result of the failure of his parent or 
guardian, as herein defined, to exercise a minimum degree of care . . . in providing 
the child with proper supervision or guardianship, by unreasonably inflicting or 
allowing to be inflicted harm, or substantial risk thereof.29 
 
The appellate court’s broad interpretation of the harm element was the sole basis 
for the court’s finding.30 Contrary to traditional child custody proceedings, the court 
ignored the requisite statutory elements for child abuse and broadly applied the 
statue to any harm inflicted on an infant.31 The child abuse or neglect statute clearly 
dictates that harm inflicted on a child by a parent must be unreasonable.32 Instead 
of applying the statutory element of unreasonable harm to the case at hand, the 
court simply recounted the harm suffered by the infant. This misapplication of New 
Jersey’s child abuse or neglect statute constitutes a “sweeping, confounding 
generalization that completely ignores [the] statutory elements.”33 
 Infant Paul undeniably suffered harm from withdrawal symptoms due to his 
mother’s methadone use during pregnancy. However, the statutory provision at 
issue requires unreasonable harm to prevent unnecessary removal of a child and 
judicial overreach. In turning a blind eye to the reasonableness element of the 
statute, the court essentially held that any harm caused by the mother to a newborn 
during pregnancy constitutes child abuse. Y.N. appealed this decision, and the 
Supreme Court of New Jersey granted certification to review the issue of statutory 
interpretation regarding “whether a finding of abuse or neglect under N.J.S.A. 9:6–
8.21(c)(4)(b) can be based solely on the harm caused to Paul by methadone 
                                                          
26  Id. 
27  Id. 
28  N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:6–8.21(c)(4)(b) (West 2012); Y.N., 66 A.3d at 242. 
29  N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:6–8.21(c)(4)(b) (emphasis added). 
30  See Y.N., 66 A.3d at 242. 
31  Id. 
32  N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:6–8.21(c)(4)(b).  
33  Oral Argument at 04:00, N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. Y.N., 104 A.3d 244 (N. J. 2014) 
(No. 072804), http://165.230.71.5/query.php?var=A-24-13. 
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withdrawal—without regard to whether [Y.N.] acted unreasonably or with a 
minimum degree of care.”34 
On December 22, 2014, the Supreme Court of New Jersey reversed the holding 
of the New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division, holding that “absent 
exceptional circumstances, a finding of abuse or neglect cannot be sustained based 
solely on a newborn’s enduring methadone withdrawal following a mother’s timely 
participation in a bona fide treatment program prescribed by a licensed healthcare 
professional to whom she has made full disclosure.”35 The Supreme Court of New 
Jersey remanded the case to the appellate division to decide whether the record 
contained sufficient evidence to support the finding of child abuse or neglect on an 
alternate theory.36 
 
II. PROMISES FOR A HEALTHIER FUTURE: METHADONE MAINTENANCE 
TREATMENT 
Methadone maintenance treatment was first studied at The Rockefeller 
University in 1964 as a research project.37 After decades of research and use of MMT 
to treat heroin addiction, experts discovered the proper dosage of methadone to 
overcome many symptoms of opiate addiction.38 MMT has proved to be a successful 
form of rehabilitation for opiate addicts.39 MMT reduces cravings for opiate drugs, 
prevents opiate withdrawal symptoms, and blocks the physical effects of other 
                                                          
34  N.J. Div. of Child Prot. and Permanency v. Y.N., 104 A.3d 244, 251–52 (N.J. 2014) (emphasis 
omitted). Y.N.’s continued drug use for four months after finding out she was pregnant could be 
classified as acting unreasonably or without a minimum degree of care. However, the public interest 
of maternal and fetal health should dissuade policymakers from punishing pregnant drug addicts for 
seeking medical rehabilitation.  
35  Id. at 246. 
36  Id. at 256. 
37  Herman Joseph, Sharon Stancliff & John Langrod, Methadone Maintenance Treatment 
(MMT): A Review of Historical and Clinical Issues, 67 MOUNT SINAI J. MED. 347, 348 (2000). 
38  See id. at 348–49 (explaining the proper dose of methadone will be sufficient to relieve 
narcotic cravings, suppress opioid abstinence syndrome for twenty-four to thirty-six hours, block the 
effects of heroin, develop tolerance to the narcotic effects of methadone so the individual’s emotional 
responses, functions, and perception are not impaired, and develop tolerance to analgesic properties 
of methadone). 
39  See Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ) about Methadone and Pregnancy, NAT’L ADVOCS. FOR 
PREGNANT WOMEN, http://advocatesforpregnantwomen.org/MethadoneFAQ.pdf (last visited Jan. 6, 
2015) [hereinafter FAQ about Methadone and Pregnancy]; see also Methadone Treatment for Pregnant 
Women, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. (2006), http://advocatesforpregnantwomen.org/SAMHSA 
%20Brochure%20%2522Methadone%20Treatment%20for%20Pregnant%20Women%2522.pdf; 
Comm. on Health Care for Underserved Women & Am. Soc’y Addiction Med., Opioid Abuse, 
Dependence, and Addiction in Pregnancy, AM. C. OBSTETRICIANS & GYNECOLOGISTS (May 2012), 
http://acog.org/Resources-And-Publications/Committee-Opinions/Committee-on-Health-Care-for 
-Underserved-Women/Opioid-Abuse-Dependence-and-Addiction-in-Pregnancy. 
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opiates.40 The use of MMT has consistently demonstrated a reduction in illicit drug 
use and a significant drop in the likelihood of overdose and death.41 
Since the 1970s, MMT has been the optimal treatment for heroin addiction 
for pregnant women.42 MMT “remains the gold standard” for treating opiate 
addiction in pregnant women.43 There is a clear medical consensus that MMT during 
pregnancy provides benefits for both the woman and the fetus.44 The Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention declared methadone maintenance treatment “the 
most effective treatment for opiate addiction” and included “improved pregnancy 
outcomes” as one of the important benefits of MMT. 45 The United States 
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) reported that MMT can save a 
newborn’s life by blocking withdrawal symptoms.46 The World Health Organization 
(WHO) published a “strong”—as opposed to standard—recommendation that 
methadone maintenance treatment should be used to treat opiate dependency in 
pregnancy.47 The WHO reserves “strong” recommendations for treatments or 
interventions that “most individuals should receive . . . [and] most individuals would 
want . . . and only a small proportion would not[;]” and further stating that “the 
recommendation could unequivocally be used for policy making.”48 The WHO went 
as far as to recommend MMT over all other opiate agonist maintenance 
treatments.49 
The evidence supporting MMT over other forms of treatment for opiate 
addicts is “clear and unambiguous.”50 Because of the clear and unambiguous 
evidence supporting MMT, the National Institutes of Health considers “the safety 
                                                          
40  FAQ about Methadone and Pregnancy, supra note 39. 
41  Id. 
42          See Brief of Proposed Amici Curiae Experts in Maternal and Fetal Health, Public Health, and 
Drug Treatment in Support of Defendant-Petitioner’s Petition for Certification at 6, N.J. Div. of Youth 
& Family Servs. v. Y.N., 66 A.3d 237 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2013) (No. A–5880–11T2) [hereinafter 
Brief of Proposed Amici Curiae]; see also Comm. on Health Care for Underserved Women & Am. 
Soc’y Addiction Med., supra note 39. 
43  Stacy Seikel, Methadone Treatment in Pregnancy…That Can’t Be Right, Can It?, 63 N.E. FLA. 
MED. 28, 29 (2012). 
44  See, e.g., Brief of Proposed Amici Curiae, supra note 42, at 8–9. 
45  Methadone Maintenance Treatment, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Feb. 2002),  
http://www.nhts.net/media/Methadone%20Maintenance%20Treatment%20(20).pdf. 
46  See Methadone Treatment for Pregnant Women, supra note 39.  
47  See Guidelines for the Psychosocially Assisted Pharmacological Treatment of Opioid 
Dependence, WORLD HEALTH ORG. xviii (2009), http://www.who.int/substance_abuse/publications/o 
pioid_dependence_guidelines.pdf. 
48  Id. at xiii (explaining that standard recommendations are given when “most individuals 
would want the suggested course of action, but an appreciable proportion would not,” and “values 
and preferences vary widely”). 
49  See id. at xi.  
50  Brief of Proposed Amici Curiae, supra note 42, at 7 (citing L. Amato, M. Davoli, C.A. Perucci, 
M. Ferri, F. Faggiano & R.P. Mattick, An Overview of Systematic Reviews of the Effectiveness of Opiate 
Maintenance Therapies: Available Evidence to Inform Clinical Practice and Research, 28 J. SUBSTANCE 
ABUSE TREATMENT 321, 326 (2005)). 
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and efficacy of methadone treatment ‘unequivocally established’” and supports 
MMT “as the most effective treatment for this condition.”51 
Not only does use of MMT for opiate-addicted pregnant women reduce 
maternal illness and mortality rates, but it also promotes fetal growth and stability, 
as compared to mothers who use heroin during pregnancy.52 MMT during 
pregnancy is associated with “better compliance with obstetric care and better 
preparation for parenting responsibilities.”53  
Maternal recovery from illicit drug addiction is important for the long-term 
health and safety of a mother and her child.54 Methadone treatment during 
pregnancy increases the likelihood of the mother achieving recovery from her 
addiction early in treatment and becoming a sustainable provider.55 
 
A. Neonatal Abstinence Syndrome 
Although MMT remains the best treatment to combat opiate addiction 
during pregnancy, it is likely to cause neonatal abstinence syndrome in infants.56 
NAS manifests as “the constellation of symptoms and signs exhibited by infants, who 
had intrauterine exposure to addictive drugs like opiates . . .[,] which can cause 
physical and psychological dependence.”57 
NAS in infants is an expected and medically controllable consequence of 
methadone use during pregnancy.58 The intensity of NAS symptoms and the medical 
care required is case specific.59 Infants who experience mild symptoms resulting 
from NAS may not need any medical treatment,60 while infants who experience 
moderate to severe symptoms of NAS are treated with medication-assisted 
withdrawal methods, which can require anywhere from three to five weeks of 
hospital monitoring.61 
                                                          
51  Id. at 7–8. 
52  See John J. McCarthy, Martin H. Leamon, Michael S. Parr & Barbara Anania, High-Dose 
Methadone Maintenance in Pregnancy: Maternal and Neonatal Outcomes, 193 AM. J. OBSTETRICS & 
GYNECOLOGY 606 (2005). 
53  Id.  
54  Id. 
55  Id. at 609.  
56  See Joseph et al., supra note 37, at 355; see also C. Dryden, D. Young, M. Hepburn & H. 
Mactier, Maternal Methadone Use in Pregnancy: Factors Associated with the Development of Neonatal 
Abstinence Syndrome and Implications for Healthcare Resources, 116 BJOG 665 (2009). 
57  V. Tiroumourougane Serane & Ommen Kurian, Neonatal Abstinence Syndrome, 75 INDIAN J. 
PEDIATRICS 911 (2008). 
58  Id. 
59  See, e.g., id.; Seikel, supra note 43, at 29. 
60  McCarthy et al., supra note 52. 
61  Id. 
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Regardless of the intensity of the symptoms experienced, infants who suffer 
from NAS do not face long-term physical or mental disabilities or abnormalities.62 
Infants born to mothers who received both methadone treatment during pregnancy 
and prenatal care showed normal development.63 HHS reported that babies born to 
mothers on methadone do as well as other babies, and better than babies born to 
mothers on heroin.64 While use of a methadone treatment regimen by a pregnant 
woman can cause some complications in the first few weeks of the infant’s life, these 
complications are medically manageable.65 Medical studies show that possible 
complications are outweighed by the benefits of methadone treatment: stable opiate 
levels for the pregnant woman and fetus (drastically decreasing the likelihood of 
fetal death) and disassociation from the heroine lifestyle and its negative 
consequences.66  
 
B. Policy Implications of Pregnant Women, MMT & State Intervention 
Punishing women for seeking treatment for their opiate addictions 
negatively impacts the health of the women and their unborn children. Pregnant 
women who quit opiate use cold turkey risk fetal death due to fetal withdrawal 
symptoms.67 Pregnant women who continue to use heroin subject the fetus to daily 
fluctuations of opiate abstinence syndrome, which can result in “stillbirth, 
premature delivery, low birth weight, and sudden infant death syndrome.”68 In 
addition to fetal harm or death, the lifestyle associated with heroin addiction can 
cause various harms to pregnant women: transmission of diseases such as HIV and 
hepatitis, poor nutrition, and other complications from the use of contaminated 
needles.69 
Medical experts have considered the delicate balance between protecting 
fetuses from unnecessary harm and incentivizing pregnant women to seek medical 
care for the wellbeing of the women and the fetuses. While MMT alone is 
insufficient to combat all of the issues a heroin addict must confront, when MMT is 
combined with prenatal care, medical care, nutritional counseling, and attention to 
                                                          
62  See Joseph et al., supra note 37, at 356 (“[N]o chronic conditions or abnormalities attributable 
to methadone have been identified in those children exposed to methadone in utero when their 
mothers also received prenatal care.”). 
63  Id. (“A follow-up study of 25 four-year-olds whose mothers were maintained on methadone 
during their pregnancies and who had received prenatal care showed normal development . . . The 
results of all neurological examinations were within normal parameters, and there was no 
relationship between IQ scores and the severity of the abstinence syndrome at time of birth. There 
were no statistical differences between the infants exposed to methadone in utero and non-exposed 
controls.”). 
64  Methadone Treatment for Pregnant Women, supra note 46. 
65  Joseph et al., supra note 37, at 356. 
66  See, e.g., id. at 355. 
67  See FAQ about Methadone and Pregnancy, supra note 39. 
68  Joseph et al., supra note 37, at 355. 
69  Id. 
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all the medical, personal, and social concerns the patient may face, a pregnant 
woman can overcome her heroin addiction in a manner that is healthy for both 
herself and the fetus.70 
Without the option to receive MMT, many pregnant women will completely 
forgo necessary medical and prenatal care out of fear that the government will take 
their children away.71 This is not the first time in history that pregnant drug addicts 
have faced discrimination. During the “crack baby” scare of the 1980’s,72 Congress 
passed laws to extend the length of criminal sentences for crack cocaine offenses.73 
Pregnant women were targeted and routinely prosecuted for use of crack cocaine.74 
Today, women who take proactive steps to curb drug addiction are punished with 
removal of their children from their custody and faced with potential criminal 
charges for the use of MMT during pregnancy. 
Legislative policies related to pregnant women undergoing MMT should 
reflect the research of medical and scientific experts and should be focused on 
improving maternal and infant health. Enacting policies in such a way has been 
termed by Professor Dawn Johnsen, a legal scholar in the area of civil liberties, as 
the “facilitative model.”75 The facilitative model operates under the assumption that 
each pregnant woman is in the best situation to decide for herself how to balance 
reducing risks for unhealthy fetal development with competing demands and 
desires.76 Such competing interests include whether “to continue working in their 
jobs” while dealing with “illness, addiction, poor information, lack of health 
insurance, and poverty.”77 A facilitative model is the most effective model in cases 
of women using drugs during pregnancy;78 policies that are enacted according to the 
facilitative model can save government dollars while providing benefits to the 
pregnant woman and her fetus.79 
                                                          
70  See id. 
71  Brief of Proposed Amici Curiae, supra note 42, at 3; see also Ehrlich, supra note 7, at 392. This 
disincentive to seek prenatal care is reminiscent of the “crack baby” scare in the 1980’s. In the 1980’s, 
the fear of losing custody of their babies or being arrested caused pregnant crack cocaine addicts to 
avoid seeking prenatal care. Craig Reinarman & Harry G. Levine, Crack in the Rearview Mirror: 
Deconstructing Drug War Mythology, 31 SOC. JUST. 182, 194 (2004). 
72  E.g., Clay Dillow, How Science Got the ‘Crack Baby’ Epidemic So Wrong, POPULAR SCI. (May 
20, 2013), http://www.popsci.com/science/article/2013-05/crack-baby-epidemic-never-happened. 
73  Reinarman & Levine, supra note 71, at 182. 
74  See Ehrlich, supra note 7, at 386. 
75  See Dawn E. Johnsen, Shared Interests: Promoting Healthy Births Without Sacrificing 
Women’s Liberty, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 569, 573 (1992). 
76  Id. at 573 (explaining the core assumption of facilitative policies is that maternal and infant 
health can best be improved by “building on the shared interests of women and the government”). 
77  Id. at 574. It could be argued that a woman who abused drugs is not the best person to make 
decisions regarding her competing desires and demands. However, in this Note, I discuss women 
who have sought medical rehabilitation to overcome drug addiction. These women are receiving 
treatment to become healthy and aid fetal development. 
78  Id. at 571–72. 
79  Id. at 574.  
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For pregnant women, the government has a strong interest in implementing 
policies that will positively impact the likelihood that the woman’s baby will be 
healthy.80 While a woman is pregnant, “the government can affect fetal 
development, and thus the health of the infant at birth, only through the woman’s 
body and actions.”81 However, if formulated improperly, government policies aimed 
at healthy births and healthy children can result in the opposite effect.82 
Negative social stigmas that exist regarding drug addicts, especially regarding 
pregnant drug addicts, often lead to irrational policymaking. These stigmas have 
caused the legislature and courts to view drug addicts as second-class citizens. Since 
the beginning of MMT programs, people undergoing the treatment have been 
stigmatized as merely “substitut[ing] one drug for another.”83 This belief blurs the 
crucial line between “an active heroin addiction and the use of methadone in a 
maintenance program.”84 As a result, the legislature has enacted policies based on 
the adversarial model,85 in which the pregnant woman and fetus are viewed as two 
distinct entities with competing interests.86 
The appellate court’s interpretation of the New Jersey model, in which a 
pregnant woman can be charged with civil child abuse for participating in MMT, is 
an example of a policy enacted under the adversarial approach that punishes women 
for seeking necessary medical treatment while pregnant.87 The policy deters women 
from seeking necessary prenatal care, medical services, and other rehabilitation 
treatment by instilling fear of government intervention, civil child abuse and neglect 
charges, loss of custody, and criminal prosecution. 
When a drug addict seeks medical help to overcome the addiction (whether 
pregnant or not), the state has a public health interest in encouraging the 
individual’s rehabilitation. This interest increases in the case of pregnant drug 
addicts, for the state then has an interest in the health of the woman and the fetus. 
                                                          
80  Id. at 570. 
81  Id. 
82  See id. at 570–71 (“[T]he most effective policies for improving the health of newborns are 
those that facilitate women’s choices, not those that infringe on their liberty.”). 
83  Joseph et al., supra note 37, at 358. 
84  Id. 
85  See Johnsen, supra note 75, at 576. 
86  Id. In November 2014, Colorado voters rejected a “personhood” measure (for the third time), 
which proposed inclusion of unborn fetuses as “children” under the state’s criminal code. Zach 
Schonfeld, Fetal ‘Personhood’ Laws Defeated in Colorado and North Dakota, NEWSWEEK (Nov. 5, 2014, 
3:27 PM), http://www.newsweek.com/fetal-personhood-laws-defeated-colorado-and-north-dakota-
282545. North Dakota voters rejected a ballot measure, which would have added to the state 
constitution: “[t]he inalienable right to life of every human being at any stage of development must 
be recognized and protected.” Tierney Sneed, A Tale of Two ‘Personhood’ Amendments, U.S. NEWS & 
WORLD REP. (Oct. 29, 2014, 6:00 AM), http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2014/10/29/personhoo 
d-amendments-shake-up-elections-in-north-dakota-colorado. State “personhood” proposals in the 
2014 election reflected the idea of treating the pregnant woman and fetus as two separate entities 
with conflicting interests. Id. 
87  See infra Part III. 
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The overwhelming amount of medical and scientific research supporting MMT for 
pregnant women should lead policymakers to enact policies that support this 
medical consensus. If the public interests are the health of the fetus and the mother, 
these ends are not achieved by penalizing women for seeking help to overcome their 
addiction. 
 
III. EXPLORING THE APPELLATE COURT’S REASONING IN Y.N. 
Returning to the case of Y.N., the New Jersey Superior Court Appellate 
Division applied the New Jersey child abuse and neglect statute in a manner so broad 
that it did not even consider the statutory language or purpose. The statute requires 
unreasonable harm or risk of harm for a finding of child abuse or neglect.88 
Therefore, the proper inquiry should have examined whether the harm Y.N. caused 
to her infant was reasonable. 
While conducting a reasonableness analysis, it is important to note that the 
newborn tested positive for methadone, but not Percocet.89 The State never alleged 
that Y.N. was using illegal drugs during her pregnancy. Furthermore, methadone 
maintenance treatment is easily distinguished from illicit drugs used by a mother 
during pregnancy.90 As discussed earlier, MMT is well regarded as the appropriate 
treatment for opiate addiction.91 Besides Y.N.’s use of prescribed methadone 
treatment, there were no other findings of child abuse or neglect by Y.N.92 
Therefore, the State’s basis for removing the child relied solely on the fact that Y.N. 
used her prescribed methadone treatment. 
Determining whether a pregnant woman’s actions were “reasonable” during 
pregnancy is purely a subjective test; the legislature does not provide a clear line for 
how “unreasonable” a pregnant woman’s actions would need to be in order to satisfy 
the child abuse or neglect statute. Almost all daily activities of a pregnant woman 
have the ability to affect the fetus and potentially cause harm. For example, a woman 
could be charged with child abuse for exercising too much during pregnancy if it 
had a negative impact on the fetus that the state classified as “unreasonable harm.” 
In another scenario, a woman’s refusal to take expensive prenatal vitamins that 
would benefit the fetus could be deemed unreasonable. These scenarios are just a 
few of many that show the line between reasonable and unreasonable harm to a 
fetus is blurred in instances of a pregnant woman’s legal activity.93 
                                                          
88  See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:6–8.21(c)(4)(b) (West 2013). 
89  Oral Argument at 02:33, N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. Y.N., 104 A.3d 244 (N. J. 2014) 
(No. 072804), http://165.230.71.5/query.php?var=A-24-13. 
90  See, e.g., Ilene B. Anderson & Thomas E. Kearney, Use of Methadone, 172 WEST J. MED. 43 
(2000). 
91  See supra Part II. 
92  See N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. Y.N., 66 A.3d 237 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2013). 
93          The Alabama Supreme Court held that a “child” under the chemical-endangerment statues 
includes all unborn children. Therefore, a woman can be held criminally liable for exposing a fetus 
to, “a controlled substance, chemical substance, or drug paraphernalia.” Ex parte Hicks v. Ala., 153 
So.3d 53, 54–55 (Ala. 2014) (citing Ala. Code § 26-15-3.2 (2014)). 
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Even if one was to accept the legitimacy of the reasonableness provision of 
the New Jersey child abuse and neglect statute, Y.N.’s conduct during her pregnancy 
was reasonable in light of her particular circumstances. As a pregnant woman 
addicted to opiates, Y.N. had three choices: (1) continue using opiates, which would 
ultimately lead to child abuse charges and her child’s removal at birth; (2) abruptly 
cease any drug use and face the possibility of miscarriage or stillbirth; or (3) seek 
medical treatment for her drug addiction. Faced with three difficult choices, all of 
which would likely result in some degree of harm to the fetus, Y.N. chose the most 
reasonable—and medically recommended—option.  
Instead of commending Y.N.’s proactive steps during her pregnancy, the 
appellate court relied on In re Guardianship of K.H.O.94 to classify her infant’s 
withdrawal symptoms as harm.95 The K.H.O. case differs drastically from the case of 
Y.N. because the mother in K.H.O. was using heroin and the newborn suffered from 
heroin withdrawal.96 Comparing the cases of K.H.O. and Y.N. illuminates the 
problem with the broad application of civil child abuse statutes. Heroin is an illegal 
drug that was not prescribed by a doctor to K.H.O.’s mother, and served no medical 
purpose.97 An absence of all of these factors from the case of Y.N. demonstrates that 
the application of K.H.O. was inapposite. 
Most notably, the appellate court held that for child abuse and neglect 
claims, it does not matter whether the pregnant woman was prescribed the 
methadone, or whether she obtained it from an illegal source.98 This lies at the heart 
of the catch-22 problem for pregnant women who need medical treatment during 
their pregnancies. If a woman can be charged with child abuse or neglect from the 
side effects suffered by the newborn for any drug she takes while pregnant,99 she is 
less likely to seek proper and necessary medical treatment. In fact, she is likely to 
forgo not only the treatment for her drug addiction, but also prenatal care as a 
whole.100 And, as medical experts have noted in cases of drug addiction, if a pregnant 
woman does not seek medical treatment, there is a possibility that the drug use—or 
withdrawals from unsuccessful attempts to quit—will result in a miscarriage or 
stillbirth. 
                                                          
94  736 A.2d 1246 (N.J. 1999). 
95  Y.N., 66 A.3d at 243 (citing In re Guardianship of K.H.O., 736 A.2d 1246). 
96  Id. at 1249. 
97  See id. 
98  Y.N., 66 A.3d at 242. 
99  Id. at 241. The trial court based its finding of child abuse or neglect without distinguishing 
methadone treatment from illicit drugs. The judge reasoned, “[w]hen a child is born drug exposed to 
illicit drugs, we routinely say that’s abuse and neglect.” Id. 
100  See Brief of Proposed Amici Curiae, supra note 42, at 3; see also Abuse Reporting and 
Pregnancy: The Role of the Obstetrician-Gynecologist, AM. CONGRESS OBSTETRICIANS & GYNECOLOGISTS 
(Jan. 2011), http://www.acog.org/Resources-And-Publications/Committee-Opinions/Committee-on-
Health-Care-for-Underserved-Women/Substance-Abuse-Reporting-and-Pregnancy-The-Role-of-th 
e-Obstetrician-Gynecologist. 
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Since methadone treatment improves the health and well-being of both the 
pregnant woman and fetus, methadone is indistinguishable from other drugs 
prescribed to pregnant women to improve or maintain fetal health. Many pregnant 
women require prescription drug therapy due to a variety of conditions developed 
during pregnancy.101 According to medical professionals, to promote the interest of 
fetal safety, “effective drugs that have been in use for long periods are preferable to 
newer alternatives.”102 Methadone has been tested and used to successfully treat 
opiate addiction for decades.103 
Many drugs used during pregnancy, whether prescribed by doctors or 
available over the counter, result in increased the likelihood of fetal harm. For 
example, a study of pregnant women who were prescribed antidepressants (tricyclic 
antidepressants or selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors) displayed a positive 
correlation between the use of antidepressants in utero and a significantly increased 
risk of preterm delivery.104 In utero fetal exposure to decongestants, one of the most 
commonly used over-the-counter medications during pregnancy, has been shown 
to result in birth defects to newborns.105 Therefore, under the appellate court’s 
holding, even a pregnant woman who uses Sudafed for a common cold as per her 
doctor’s advice can find herself facing child abuse and neglect charges. 
The potential for fetal harm and birth defects resulting from use of these 
drugs displays the difficult problem that results from trying to protect the health of 
both the pregnant woman and the fetus separately. Fetal development, well-being, 
and behavior are implicated by depression in pregnant women.106 However, if the 
pregnant woman takes antidepressants, there is an increased chance of preterm 
delivery.107 This exemplifies the reasons why medical professionals, in consultation 
with their patients, should prescribe treatment regimens—not the courts. 
                                                          
101  Gideon Koren, Anne Pastuszak & Shinya Ito, Drugs in Pregnancy, 338 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1128, 
1135 (1998). 
102  Id. 
103  See Joseph et al., supra note 37, at 348. 
104  See Hanan El Marroun, Vincent W. V. Jaddoe, James J. Hudziak, Sabine J. Roza, Eric A. P. 
Steegers, Albert Hofman, Frank C. Verhulst, Tonya J. H. White, Bruno H. C. Stricker & Henning 
Tiemeier, Maternal Use of Selective Serotonin Reuptake Inhibitors, Fetal Growth, and Risk of Adverse 
Birth Outcomes, 69 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 706, 710 (2012); see also Robert L. Davis, David 
Rubanowice, Heather McPhillips, Marsha A. Raebel, Susan E. Andrade, David Smith, Marianne 
Ulcickas Yood & Richard Platt, Risks of Congenital Malformations and Perinatal Events Among 
Infants Exposed to Antidepressant Medications During Pregnancy, 16 PHARMACOEPIDEMIOLOGY & 
DRUG SAFETY 1086, 1093 (2007). 
105  Wai-Ping Yau, Allen A. Mitchell, Kueiyu Joshua Lin, Martha M. Werler & Sonia Hernández-
Díaz, Use of Decongestants During Pregnancy and the Risk of Birth Defects, 178 AM. J. EPIDEMIOL. 198, 
198 (2013) (“Epidemiologic studies of specific decongestants have identified elevated risks of specific 
birth defects, including defects of the heart, eyes and ears, gut, abdominal wall, and feet.”). 
106  See generally Judith Alder, Nadine Fink, Johannes Bitzer, Irene Hösli & Wolfgang Holzgreve, 
Depression and Anxiety During Pregnancy: A Risk Factor for Obstetric, Fetal, and Neonatal Outcome? 
A Critical Review of the Literature, 20 J. MATERNAL-FETAL & NEONATAL MED. 189 (2007). 
107  See Hanan El Marroun, et al., supra note 104. 
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 A fetus should not be considered a separate “person” from the woman 
carrying the fetus. Considering a fetus a separate “person” from the moment of 
fertilization implicates a woman’s rights, including a woman’s ability to obtain MMT 
during pregnancy.108 Recognizing a fertilized egg as a “person” will deprive a woman 
of the choice to have an abortion.109 If a woman and her fetus are considered 
separate people, a woman with a life-threatening pregnancy would not be able to 
abort the fetus to save her own life.110 
 
IV. THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT OF 1990 
The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 was passed by an overwhelming 
majority111 with the congressional intent of providing full and equal opportunity for 
Americans with disabilities.112 The ADA provides protection for individuals who are 
discriminated against based on their disability in various critical areas: “housing, 
public accommodations, education, transportation, communication, recreation, 
institutionalization, health services, voting, and access to public services.”113 
Title I of the ADA requires employers to provide qualified individuals with a 
disability the equal opportunity to benefit from employment-related 
opportunities.114 Title I prohibits employers from discriminating in “recruitment, 
hiring, promotions, training, pay, social activities, and other privileges of 
employment.”115 Title II of the ADA covers all state and local government activities, 
regardless of the entity’s size or receipt of federal funding.116 Title II requires state 
and local governments to give people with disabilities the equal opportunity to 
benefit from government programs, services, and activities.117 For instance, a 
transportation provision is included in Title II, prohibiting public transportation 
authorities from discriminating against people with disabilities in providing 
                                                          
108  See ACOG Statement on “Personhood” Measures, AM. CONGRESS OBSTETRICIANS & 
GYNECOLOGISTS (Feb. 10, 2012), http://www.acog.org/About_ACOG/News_Room/News_Releases/201 
2/Personhood_Measures. 
109  See id. 
110  Erik Eckholm, Push for ‘Personhood’ Amendment Represents New Tack in Abortion Fight, N.Y. 
TIMES (Oct. 25, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/26/us/politics/personhood-amendments-
would-ban-nearly-all-abortions.html?_r=0. 
111  NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, EQUALITY OF OPPORTUNITY: THE MAKING OF THE AMERICANS 
WITH DISABILITIES ACT 101 (1997). 
112  See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b) (2012).  
113  Id. § 12101(a)(3). 
114  42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–213 (2012); A Guide to Disability Rights Laws, supra note 8. 
115  Id. 
116  Id. 
117  Id. 
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services.118 Title III of the ADA extends nondiscrimination requirements to private 
entities, businesses, nonprofit service providers, and commercial facilities.119 
In particular, Title II of the ADA mandates: “[N]o qualified individual with a 
disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be 
denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or 
subjected to discrimination by any such entity.”120 “Public entity” is defined broadly 
in the statute: “any state or local government; any department, agency, special 
purpose district, or other instrumentality of a State or States or local government.”121 
Title II applies to all state and federal activities, programs, and branches of state and 
federal government, regardless of whether the program or activity receives federal 
funding.122 
While the scope of public entities covered by Title II of the ADA is not 
enumerated, Congress and the United States Supreme Court have applied the 
“public entity” standard broadly.123 The purpose statement of the ADA indicates that 
Congress intended to “invoke the sweep of congressional authority” and eliminate 
all forms of state discrimination.124 Title II specifically targets discrimination in 
public services, which further indicates congressional intent to eliminate such 
discrimination in the public sector.125  
The Supreme Court has held that public services not enumerated by Title II 
are still protected, as “the fact that the ADA can be ‘applied in situations not 
expressly anticipated by Congress does not demonstrate ambiguity. It demonstrates 
breadth.’”126 Federal courts have broadly interpreted “service” under Title II to apply 
to a wide array of public services: social services,127 arrests,128 education,129 housing,130 
                                                          
118  See, e.g., Tandy v. City of Wichita, 380 F.3d 1277, 1287 (10th Cir. 2004); Walter v. Se. Pa. 
Transp. Auth., 434 F. Supp. 2d 346, 350–51 (E.D. Pa. 2006); Liberty Res., Inc. v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 
155 F. Supp. 2d 242, 253 (E.D. Pa. 2001) (“Improving transportation services for disabled persons is a 
key component of the ADA.”). 
119  42 U.S.C. § 12184(a). 
120  Id. § 12132. 
121  Id. §§ 12131(1)(A)–(B). 
122  A Guide to Disability Rights Laws, supra note 8. 
123  See, e.g., Pa. Dep’t of Corrections v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 212 (1998) (stating that even though 
the language in 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b) did not mention prisons, prisons fell squarely within the statutory 
definition of “public entity” and the statute demonstrated “breadth,” not ambiguity). 
124  42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(4). 
125  Id. § 12132. 
126  Pa. Dep’t of Corrections, 524 U.S. at 212 (holding the “public entity” requirement of Title II of 
the ADA applies to state prisons (quoting Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 499 (1985)). 
127  See Henrietta D. v. Bloomberg, 331 F.3d 261, 261–62 (2d Cir. 2003). 
128  See Delano-Pyle v. Victoria Cnty., 302 F.3d 567, 567 (5th Cir. 2002). 
129  See Smith v. Univ. of N.Y., No. 95–CV–0477E(H), 1997 WL 800882, at *6 (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 31, 
1997); Garret v. Chicago Reform Bd. of Trs., No. 95–C–7341, 1996 WL 411319, at *1, *3 (N.D. Ill. July 19, 
1996); Essen v. Bd. of Educ. of Ithaca City Sch. Dist., No. 92–CV–1164(FJS)(GJD), 1996 WL 191948, at 
*9 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 15, 1996). 
130  See Burgess v. Alameda Hous. Auth., 98 F. App’x 603, 605–06 (9th Cir. 2004). 
Indiana Journal of Law and Social Equality Vol. 4, Issue 1 
 
*    114 
loans,131 transportation,132 and even parole proceedings.133 The Second Circuit Court 
of Appeals held that “programs, services, or activities,” in Title II is a “catch-all 
phrase that prohibits all discrimination by a public entity, regardless of the 
context.”134 Therefore, it follows that the Title II “public entity” provision may apply 
to state child welfare services. 
For purposes of Title II, a “qualified individual” is defined as: 
 
an individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable modifications to 
rules, policies, or practices, the removal of architectural, communication or 
transportation barriers, or the provision of auxiliary aids and services, meets the 
essential eligibility requirements for the receipt of services or the participation in 
programs or activities provided by a public entity.135 
 
“Disability” under Title II of the ADA is defined as: “a physical or mental 
impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such 
individual; a record of such impairment; or being regarded as having such an 
impairment.”136 
The ADA does not expound upon what qualifies as an “impairment.” In 1989, 
while discussing the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990,137 the Senate 
enumerated “drug addiction” as one form of physical or mental impairment.138 Title 
II of the ADA expressly excludes individuals who are “currently engaging in the 
illegal use of drugs.” 139 The statutory language of the ADA explains that the 
exclusion of individuals currently engaged in the illegal use of drugs exception does 
not apply to an individual who:  
 
has successfully completed a supervised drug rehabilitation program and is no 
longer engaging in the illegal use of drugs, or has otherwise been rehabilitated 
successfully and is no longer engaging in such use; is participating in a supervised 
rehabilitation program and is no longer engaging in such use; or is erroneously 
regarded as engaging in such use, but is not engaging in such use.140 
                                                          
131  See Gaona v. Town & Country Credit, 324 F.3d 1050, 1050 (8th Cir. 2003). 
132  See Tandy v. City of Wichita, 380 F.3d 1277, 1277 (10th Cir. 2004). 
133  See Thompson v. Davis, 295 F.3d 890, 893–94 (9th Cir. 2002). 
134  Innovative Health Sys. v. City of White Plains, 117 F.3d 37, 45 (2d Cir. 1997). 
135  42 U.S.C. §12102(1) (2012). 
136  Id. § 12102(1)(A)–(C). 
137  Then known as the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1989. 
138  S. REP. NO. 101-116, at 22 (1989) (discussing the application of the term physical or mental 
impairment. While the ADA differs in some regards from the Senate bill explained in the report, this 
portion of the Senate bill did not change. The Senate’s report about the bill provides a non-exhaustive 
list of examples of “physical or mental impairment”: “such conditions, diseases, and infections as: 
orthopedic, visual, speech and hearing impairments, cerebral palsy, epilepsy, muscular dystrophy, 
multiple sclerosis, infection with [HIV], cancer, heart disease, diabetes, mental retardation, 
emotional illness, specific learning disabilities, drug addiction, and alcoholism.”) (emphasis added). 
139  42 U.S.C. § 12114(a). 
140  Id. § 12114(b)(1–3). 
Indiana Journal of Law and Social Equality Vol. 4, Issue 1 
 
*    115 
 
Courts have applied this language to protect individuals who have fully recovered 
from drug addiction or are in a rehabilitation program to recover from drug 
addiction.141 
When methadone is prescribed by a licensed medical professional, the 
methadone, and use thereof, is not illegal.142 In cases, such as Y.N., when the state 
child protection agency removes a child from the mother’s custody because of her 
prescribed methadone use, the agency’s action falls outside of the “currently 
engaging in” exception, and accordingly, violates Title II of the ADA. 
A woman undergoing MMT is a “qualified individual with a disability” under 
Title II of the ADA. Drug addiction is a form of mental impairment, and while a 
woman is undergoing MMT, the woman does not fall under the “currently engaged 
in the illegal use of drugs” exception. Additionally, a state child services department 
qualifies as a “public entity” within Title II. However, it is less clear whether the 
state’s child removal action would be considered Title II “discrimination.” Courts 
have held that in order for an individual to state a claim that he or she has been 
“subjected to discrimination” by a public entity, a plaintiff must prove that he or she 
was either “excluded from participation in or denied the benefits of some public 
entity’s services, programs, or activities, or was otherwise discriminated against by 
the public entity,” and, “that such exclusion, denial of benefits, or discrimination 
was by reason of the plaintiff’s disability.”143 A plaintiff must satisfy both elements 
of this two-part test in order to properly state a Title II claim.144 
 
V. EXTENDING TRADITIONAL APPLICATIONS OF TITLE II TO COVER 
PRENANT WOMEN PARTICIPATING IN MMT 
Individuals participating in methadone maintenance treatment already 
qualify as individuals with a disability under Title II of the ADA. Several federal 
appellate courts have recognized that MMT patients are protected from 
discrimination based on their disability.145 
                                                          
141  See, e.g., United States v. S. Mgmt. Corp., 955 F.2d 914, 922 (4th Cir. 1992). 
142  See RICHARD A. RETTIG & ADAM YARMOLINSKY, FEDERAL REGULATION OF METHADONE 
TREATMENT 2 (1995). 
143  Gohier v. Enright, 186 F.3d 1216, 1219 (10th Cir. 1999) (citing Tyler v. City of Manhattan, 894 
F.Supp. 1429 (D.Kan. 1994)); see also Weinreich v. L.A. Cnty. Metro. Transp. Auth., 114 F.3d 976, 978 
(9th Cir. 1997). 
144  See Does 1–5 v. Chandler, 83 F.3d 1150, 1155 (9th Cir. 1996).  
145  See, e.g., New Directors Treatment Servs. v. City of Reading, 490 F.3d 293 (3d Cir. 2007); see 
also MX Grp., Inc. v. City of Covington, 293 F.3d 326 (6th Cir. 2002) (holding that a methadone clinic 
bringing a suit on behalf of its patients was bringing suit on behalf of people with a disability who 
were protected by ADA Title II); Bay Area Addiction Res. & Treatment, Inc. v. City of Antioch, 179 
F.3d 725 (9th Cir. 1999).   
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Child protection agencies are state agencies, and, as such, are subject to the 
provisions of Title II of the ADA.146 Child protective services “is a specialized part of 
the child welfare system,”147 which is funded and supervised by the state.148 The 
Supreme Court’s acknowledgment of the breadth of Title II of the ADA149 further 
proves that child protection agencies fall within the scope of Title II public entities. 
New Jersey’s child welfare agency, the Department of Children and Families (DCF), 
receives its budget from both state (general) funds, and federal funds.150 In 2010, 
New Jersey’s Child Protection and Permanency Services, a division of DCF, expended 
a majority of its money from federal funds.151 New Jersey’s DCF is a state agency, 
which falls well within the Title II’s broad definition of “public entity.” 
Applying the two-part test to determine whether a woman whose infant was 
removed as a result of her participation in MMT while pregnant was “subjected to 
discrimination” by child protection agencies reveals that this practice violates Title 
II of the ADA. First, women who have their newborn children removed by a state 
agency are subjected to discrimination by the agency because women who do not 
participate in a drug rehabilitation program do not suffer the same consequence. 
This satisfies the first prong of a Title II discrimination claim. Second, the 
discrimination against women participating in MMT by state child protection 
agencies is solely on the basis of the disability, that is, the woman’s status as a drug 
rehabilitation program participant. Even if there is ambiguity as to whether these 
women should be protected by Title II of the ADA, any ambiguity should be resolved 
in favor of the medical consensus on the issue. 
A problem many states may encounter in trying to comply with Title II of the 
ADA, as applied to pregnant women, is the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment 
Act (CAPTA).152 CAPTA is a federal statute that requires health care providers who 
care for infants to report to child protective services any cases of infants born that 
are affected by illicit drug use or exhibit symptoms of withdrawal.153 Through 
CAPTA, states are provided with federal funding to develop state child abuse and 
neglect programs.154 CAPTA fails to distinguish between infants who are affected by 
                                                          
146  Chapter 5: The Child Welfare System: Removal, Reunification, and Termination, NAT’L 
COUNCIL DISABILITY (2012), http://www.ncd.gov/publications/2012/Sep272012/Ch5. 
147  Id. 
148  See Department of Children and Families, ST. N.J. DEP’T TREASURY (Jan. 6, 2015), 
http://www.state.nj.us/treasury/omb/publications/12budget/pdf/16.pdf. 
149  Pa. Dep’t of Corrs. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 212 (1998) (citing Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 
473 U.S. 479, 499 (1985)  (holding the “public entity” requirement of Title II of the ADA applies to 
state prisons)). 
150  Department of Children and Families, supra note 148. 
151  Id. ($233,521 was expended from federal funds; $192,231 was expended from general funds). 
152  Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act, Pub. L. No. 93-247, 88 Stat. 4 (codified as 
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 5101–06 (2012)). 
153  Keeping Children and Families Safe Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-36, 117 Stat. 800 (codified in 
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.); see also C. § 5106a(b)(2)(A)(ii) (2012). 
154  See Ellen M. Weber, Child Welfare Interventions for Drug-Dependent Pregnant Women: 
Limitations of a Non-Public Health Response, 75 UMKC L. REV. 789, 792 (2007). 
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their mothers’ illegal drug use and infants who are affected by their mothers’ 
participation in a rehabilitation program, such as MMT. In failing to acknowledge 
this critical difference, CAPTA overreaches and subjects all women who undergo 
MMT to state intervention upon the birth of their infant.155 
While CAPTA requires mandatory reporting by health care providers, it 
provides child welfare services with the discretion to decide whether to file an abuse 
or neglect charge.156 Therefore, once an infant is reported to the state child welfare 
services, in compliance with CAPTA, the state still has the opportunity to comply 
with Title II of the ADA. The state’s child welfare services can investigate the report, 
determine that the cause of the report is due to a mother’s proscribed MMT 
treatment, and then decline to continue further proceedings. However, should a 
State decide to file an abuse or neglect charge upon receiving a report under CAPTA 
on the sole basis of the mother’s use of MMT during her pregnancy, the state child 
welfare services would violate Title II of the ADA. 
Any concerns that permitting methadone use during pregnancy would lead 
to permitting or encouraging illegal drug use can be dismissed, as Title II of the ADA 
would only reach medical care that is prescribed by a doctor to genuinely treat a 
drug addiction.157 Many prescription drugs have the possibility of being abused, but 
for these situations, the doctor plays a pivotal role in deciding what medication use 
is bona fide.158 
 
CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court of New Jersey decision in Y.N. complies with the ADA 
Title II nondiscrimination by public entity provision and should serve as an example 
for other state courts to follow. The Supreme Court of New Jersey properly held that 
a finding of child abuse and neglect cannot be sustained based solely on a newborn’s 
withdrawal symptoms due to a pregnant woman’s methadone use when it is part of 
a prescribed methadone maintenance program. Additionally, the New Jersey child 
abuse and neglect statute cannot be applied in a broad, discriminatory manner 
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(“In other states (South Carolina, Illinois, Iowa), it is presumed that a newborn has been neglected 
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156  See, e.g., Steven J. Ondersma, Lorraine Halinka Malcoe & Sharon M. Simpson, Child 
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ABUSE & NEGLECT 657, 661 (2001). 
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158  See Morlino v. Med. Ctr. of Ocean Cnty., 706 A.2d 721, 732 (N.J. 1998). In this medical 
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among treatment options, doctors must rely on their training and experience, as well as such 
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against pregnant women who participate in a drug rehabilitation program without 
violating Title II of the ADA. 
The Supreme Court of New Jersey recognized the errors made by the 
appellate court in conflating prescribed methadone treatment with illicit drug use, 
and stressed the importance of “[s]trict adherence to the statutory standards” of the 
New Jersey child abuse and neglect statute because of the high stakes of abuse or 
neglect findings.159 
In doing so, the Supreme Court of New Jersey properly took into account the 
wealth of relevant medical and scientific research on MMT.160 Twenty-nine experts 
in law, public health, drug treatment, children’s welfare, and maternal and fetal 
health, 161 and twenty-six reputable institutions162 wrote an amicus brief in support 
of the mother in the case of N.J. Division of Youth & Family Services v. Y.N.,163 urging 
the Supreme Court of New Jersey to grant certiorari. The Supreme Court of New 
Jersey considered the arguments made by the amicus curiae, which stressed the 
importance and effectiveness of methadone treatment for drug addiction.164  
In applying the New Jersey child abuse and neglect statute in an unjustifiably 
broad manner, the appellate court left pregnant women without guidance as to 
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which medical decisions made during pregnancy will constitute child abuse or 
neglect. This uncertainty acts as a strong deterrent to pregnant women seeking 
necessary, and often life-saving, medical care.165 The Supreme Court of New Jersey 
condemned the detrimental reasoning of the appellate court as a “perverse 
disincentive for a pregnant woman to seek medical help and enter a bona fide 
detoxification treatment program that will address her and her baby’s health 
needs.”166 
While the newborn in the case of Y.N. suffered withdrawal symptoms, the 
harm was not unreasonable.167 The expected and manageable harm caused to infants 
from MMT is not evidence of child abuse or neglect. As in Y.N.’s case, an infant 
suffering from NAS does not experience unreasonable harm under New Jersey’s 
child abuse statute. A pregnant woman’s adherence to a bona fide medical treatment 
should never be characterized as de jure abuse or neglect.  
Furthermore, Y.N.’s use of methadone maintenance during pregnancy was 
reasonable, as the research in support of methadone treatment for pregnant women 
is clear and unambiguous.168 Medical research proves that methadone maintenance 
during pregnancy, rather than the cessation of the use of opiates entirely, reduces 
the likelihood of obstetrical complications and benefits fetal health.169 The 
withdrawal symptoms, characterized as harm by the Division of Child Protection 
and Permanency, are treatable with medical care.170 Infants who develop NAS, such 
as the infant in this case, experience “minimal to no long-term” consequences.171 
Title II of the ADA specifically prohibits public entities from discriminating 
against qualified individuals with a disability based on their disability. In the case of 
Y.N., the New Jersey Division of Youth and Family Services discriminated against 
the mother, in violation of Title II, because of her participation in a MMT program. 
The public entity (1) discriminated against Y.N. and, (2) such discrimination was by 
reason of Y.N.’s disability. As a result, the Supreme Court of New Jersey accurately 
found that the appellate court improperly applied the child abuse and neglect 
statute. Otherwise, the consequences of upholding the appellate court’s ruling 
would continue to negatively affect all pregnant women and their families. Pregnant 
women frequently experience medical conditions that require medication, and most 
of these medications have side effects.172 If the appellate court’s decision stood, any 
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medical treatment or refusal of such treatment by pregnant women could serve as 
the grounds for a finding of child abuse or neglect.  
As shown in the case of Y.N., removing a child from his or her mother on the 
basis of the mother’s use of prescribed methadone treatment during pregnancy 
violates a woman’s rights under Title II of the ADA. MMT is the optimal treatment 
for opiate addiction in pregnant women. MMT also promotes the public interest of 
fetal and maternal health. Legislative policies should reflect the findings of the 
medical community and should serve the purpose of promoting public health. 
Upholding the ruling of the appellate court would have been in violation of 
Title II of the ADA. Title II expressly protects individuals participating in drug 
rehabilitation programs from discrimination by public entities. The removal of 
children from women on the basis of the woman’s participation in MMT during 
pregnancy violates this nondiscrimination provision. 
 
